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## Chapter 3

# Overcoming Challenges

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*A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.*<sup>43</sup>

—Attributed to Winston Churchill

### FRICITION

Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.”<sup>44</sup> Friction makes simple tasks hard, acts constantly to tear down the will of the individual, and interferes with unit cohesion. From garrison to combat, friction can be caused by factors such as the physical environment, disinformation or misinformation, the nature of the mission, friendly decisions, or enemy action.

Inadequate or inaccurate intelligence contributes to friction by causing uncertainty. This uncertainty is sometimes called the “fog of war,” where things are not always what the leader expected. As

## MORAL CHALLENGES

Overcoming moral challenges requires courage. As explained in Chapter 2, moral courage is mastering the fear of social consequences, such as being perceived as disloyal, being alienated, ridiculed, punished, fired, or lowered in social status. In some cases, the right choice is crystal clear. In other cases, the correct course of action is not so clear. In the end, leaders must always act with integrity and accept full responsibility for their actions and everything their unit does or fails to do. This includes supporting those in your charge, particularly when they act under your direction. Leaders put their Marines, their unit, and the mission before themselves. Gaining moral ascendancy requires subordinates to believe their leaders genuinely care for them, they are fighting for a worthy cause, and their sacrifices are not in vain.

### *Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H. Turley*

All that stood between the North Vietnamese Army 308th Division and Quang Tri Province was the bridge at Dong Ha, defended by a company of Vietnamese Marines. Realizing that the company would not be able to hold the bridge, the senior US advisor to the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division (Forward), Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H. Turley, determined that the bridge had to be destroyed. The 308th division deputy commander would not give permission to destroy the bridge. Lieutenant Colonel Turley conferred with the Vietnamese 258th Marine Corps Brigade commander, who had local responsibility. The brigade commander said the decision would have to come from I Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Turley radioed the First Regional Assistance Command G-3 to gain permission. They

also denied the request, saying that permission would have to come from Saigon. Realizing the dire consequences of not taking action and knowing the career risk he was taking, Lieutenant Colonel Turley ordered US Army Major James Smock and Marine Captain John Ripley to blow the bridge. His decision to act prevented a regimental sized armor force from crossing the river, which blunted the North Vietnamese advance and undoubtedly saved an untold number of lives.<sup>46</sup>

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The ancient philosopher Confucius phrased it this way, “To see what is right and not to do it is want of courage.”<sup>47</sup> Moral courage is a private courage, a form of conscience that can often be an even tougher challenge than physical courage, particularly in peacetime. It serves not only as a foundation of our leadership philosophy; it is also a challenge that Marine leaders must face every day. If Marines do not have the moral courage in peacetime to meet consistently high Marine Corps standards and expectations, they are not likely to have the moral courage to make the difficult decisions that may determine the outcome of a battle or a campaign. Oftentimes, moral courage in a garrison environment takes the form of small actions, such as standing up to your peers, not giving in to pressure, and stepping in to stop a bad situation before it develops into something more significant.

### *Lance Corporal Daquota Skenandore*

On a September morning at a duty station in Japan, a suicidal Marine posted on social media that he was preparing to end his life by jumping off a building. Several Marines saw the post and sounded the alarm. Military Police were dispatched to the

Marine's barracks room, while other small-unit leaders organized teams to assist in searching for him. After searching the room without finding him, they systematically searched surrounding buildings, barracks, parking structures, and rooftops. The distressed Marine was eventually located on the 4th deck of a barracks building. Military Policeman Lance Corporal Daquota Skenandore spotted the Marine on a railing preparing to jump. Lance Corporal Skenandore immediately sprinted up four flights of stairs, and without regard to his own well-being, he reached the Marine who was dangerously non-compliant, and wrestled him from the railing. The Marine made several attempts to break free to end his own life. Mindful of their precarious position throughout the rooftop struggle, Lance Corporal Skenandore restrained the Marine and prevented further harm to himself and the Marine.<sup>48</sup>

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These acts of situational awareness and moral courage saved the lives of Marines. While it may be convenient to ignore the situation and assume things will be okay or say nothing at the risk of getting a fellow Marine in trouble, making a moral decision in a challenging situation is the inherent responsibility of every Marine.

## PHYSICAL CHALLENGES

The physical demands of battle encompass more than being fit, and these demands influence both the leader and the led. The draining effects of sleep deprivation, limited dietary options, and friction must be understood and must be a part of training.

No one is immune to fatigue. As Marines become increasingly tired, they often lose the ability to make sound, rapid decisions and are susceptible to being confused, disoriented, and ultimately, ineffective. Guts, pride, and energy drinks are not substitutes for fitness. A leader must be fit to concentrate fully on the mission or task at hand.

The exact limits of endurance cannot be determined, but physical conditioning is one method of reducing the effects of fatigue, increasing self-confidence, and reducing stress. The mental development of Marine leaders must include dealing with the natural fear of violence, which contributes significantly to the fog and friction of combat. Units, and unit leaders, that do not have the mental and physical strength to overcome fear will not be able to fight effectively and overcome friction. Captain John Ripley's actions at the Dong Ha bridge vividly depict the physical demands sometimes placed on individuals.

### ***Captain John Ripley***

When Lieutenant Colonel Turley ordered Captain Ripley and Major Smock to blow the bridge at Dong Ha, Captain Ripley determined that 500 pounds of explosives would have to be placed under the girders of the bridge. A chain link fence, topped with German steel tape, surrounded the base of the bridge. The two Americans quickly devised a plan. Captain Ripley would climb over the fence and emplace the explosives that Major Smock passed to him.

Emplacing the explosives required Captain Ripley to hand-walk along the beams, exposing his dangling body to the enemy. For two hours, in the face of enemy small arms and tank fire, he set the charges. Finally, using the battery from a destroyed jeep, Captain Ripley detonated the charges, destroyed the bridge, and stopped the enemy armor in its tracks.<sup>49</sup> Captain Ripley's superb physical conditioning allowed him to pull off this amazing feat.



**Captain John Ripley placing charges at the Dong Ha Bridge, 1 April 1972.**

### ***First Lieutenant Kenneth A. Conover***

In another example of the need for peak physical conditioning, First Lieutenant Kenneth A. Conover, during six days of intense combat in Afghanistan, demonstrated the physical stamina required of leaders under duress.

On 22 June 2012, First Lieutenant Conover led 1st Platoon, Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines on a night air assault into the enemy stronghold of Qaleh Ye Gaz, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. As the platoon established its patrol base, the enemy attacked with medium machine gun fire, automatic rifle fire, and 82-mm mortars. During the engagement, a mortar round landed

15 feet from First Lieutenant Conover. Luckily, the soft earth absorbed most of the blast. For the next six days, multiple waves of fanatical enemy fighters attacked the platoon. Within the first two days, First Lieutenant Conover led his platoon despite the loss of two Marines, the serious wounding of another, and the evacuation under fire. He continued to lead his Marines through 23 direct-fire engagements, one grenade attack, two indirect-fire attacks, and 10 enemy attempts to overrun his position. In relentless pursuit of the enemy, he directed the employment of 38 tank main gun rounds, four artillery rocket strikes, four close air support strikes, five AT-4 rockets, and two anti-personnel obstacle breaching systems. His efforts resulted in clearing two square kilometers of enemy fighters and the capture of a high-value Taliban leader along with two other fighters.<sup>50</sup>



**First Lieutenant Kenneth Conover on Patrol in Afghanistan.**

The Marines throughout the fight in Helmand Province were wearing on average 80 pounds of armor, weapons, and necessary equipment. The physical requirements of operating six days in heavy gear, assaulting through multiple structures, evacuating wounded personnel, and conducting food, water, and ammunition resupplies cannot be accomplished without prior physical preparation and stamina.

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Not every Marine will face the same physical challenge as Captain Ripley nor lead a platoon in combat like First Lieutenant Conover, but some will. Marine leaders understand this and work continuously to condition the Marines under their charge to overcome the physical challenges presented to them. A critical responsibility of every leader is to ensure that members of his or her command have every survival edge that can be provided.

Marines who lack the conditioning that comes from long, varied, and rigorous preparation will lack cohesion in action, experience higher combat losses, and uselessly expend much of their initial momentum. The gain in moral force deriving from physical training is intangible. Willpower, determination, mental poise, and muscle control all contribute to the general health and physical well-being of an individual.<sup>51</sup>

## **ADAPTABILITY AND INNOVATION**

Adaptability has long been our key to overcoming challenges. Although it is synonymous with flexibility, adaptability also embraces the spirit of innovation. Marines constantly seek to



adapt new tactics, organization methods, and procedures to the realities of the environment. Marines identify deficiencies in existing practices, discard outdated structure, and make modifications to maintain function and utility. The ability to adapt enables Marines to be comfortable within an environment dominated by friction. Experience, common sense, and the critical application of judgment all help Marine leaders persevere.

### *First Lieutenant Christian Schilt*

Marines have long known how to adapt and overcome. On 30 December 1927, a Marine patrol near Quilali, Nicaragua, engaged a large Sandinista force and suffered heavy casualties. The patrol was in desperate need of supplies and 18 Marines required medical evacuation. Marine pilots airdropped the equipment that was needed to clear a 500-foot-long makeshift



**First Lieutenant Christian Schilt**

airstrip. Between 6 and 8 January 1928, First Lieutenant Christian F. Schilt risked his life to make 10 flights onto the airstrip in the besieged town, carrying in a replacement commander and critical medical supplies. He also evacuated the 18 wounded Marines by strapping them to the wings. His feat is even more incredible considering the Vought O2U biplane had no brakes and required Marines on the ground to grab the wings and drag the aircraft to a stop as soon as it touched down.<sup>52</sup>

### *Navajo Code Talkers*

Another example of innovation born out of the need to adapt came from the Navajo Code Talkers. In the days before portable, tactical cryptographic devices, radio operators either had to transmit messages unencrypted, risking enemy interception, or laboriously encode, transmit, and decode messages. During World War I and after Pearl Harbor, the Army made limited use of Choctaw and Comanche speakers to transmit messages. Always on the lookout for innovative ideas, the Marine Corps followed the Army program with great interest. After a successful proof of concept, the Marine Corps enlisted 29 Navajo men for service as communicators. In keeping with Marine tradition, Commandant Thomas Holcomb insisted that the recruits receive



**Privates First Class Preston Toledo and Frank Toledo, Navajo Code Talkers, attached to a Marine artillery regiment in the South Pacific.**

the same basic training as other Marines. In other words, they were Marines first and specialists second. It turned out that the cryptographic solution was not as simple as speaking Navajo on the radio. The Navajo language didn't have an alphabet or words for military terms. The task of creating an alphabet and code words for military terminology fell on the new Marines. In the end, they created a code in their native language that reduced the time required to encode, transmit, and decode messages from four hours to about two minutes. As a result, the Navajo Code Talkers were combat multipliers in every Pacific campaign, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa.<sup>53</sup>

### *Innovations in Iraq and Afghanistan*

In another example from many years later, as Marine forces began to expand their lodgment during Operation Desert Shield, one of the greatest concerns was overland transportation. Faced with an acute shortage of trucks and other vehicles, Marine logisticians applied an unconventional approach to motor transportation. In addition to receiving 246 trucks from the Army, the Marines began leasing as many civilian vehicles as they could. In the end, they obtained 1,414 assorted



**"Circus Truck" pressed into service.**

trucks, which included 50 colorfully decorated 10-ton vehicles that the Marines dubbed “circus trucks.” Additionally, the Marines used 214 commercial buses and 465 sport utility vehicles to transport personnel.<sup>54</sup>

Sometimes innovation is the answer to situations that arise from cultural nuances and sensitivities, critical factors in understanding the combat environment. For example, in a program called “Team Lioness,” female Marines were trained to conduct searches for weapons and drugs on Iraqi women because of the sensitivities regarding men touching women in that culture. This is an example of not only increasing our combat effectiveness by understanding the combat environment but also of leveraging diversity within our ranks.

Adaptation happens most frequently at the small-unit level. During early August of 2010, Company L, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines were clearing the Taliban stronghold of Safar Bazaar in the Garmsir District of Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The Taliban who defended the bazaar saturated the area with IEDs. The Marine’s lightweight, compact metal detector soon proved utterly useless in detecting the nonmetallic IEDs, which had not yet been seen in country.

Prior to executing the operation, the company devised multiple nonstandard solutions to clear the bazaar, one of which was water hoses. Safar Bazaar was located on a canal off the Helmand River, so a nearly unlimited supply of water was conveniently available. Dragging a holley stick (a more than ten-foot-long, field-expedient stick with a hook on the end devised by Gunnery Sergeant Floyd Holley) across the ground to locate IED wires or



**Marines from Lima 3/1 clearing the Safar Bazaar.**

pressure plates, Marines then used water from the nearby river to soften the soil thereby allowing them to remove the devices. If the softened soil did not yield the IED, Marines secured the area and used line charges to detonate the devices. It took two weeks to completely clear the bazaar using multiple complementary lethal and nonlethal techniques. Each IED discovered and destroyed reduced a lethal risk to Marines and civilians using the bazaar and overcame a difficult Taliban challenge.

### ***Predecessors in Marine Corps Innovation***

Our reputation as innovators stems, in part, from periodic examinations of our role in the national defense structure. After World War I, our predecessors sought to redefine the Corps, which had fought alongside the Army on battlefields in France. They focused on the requirement to seize advanced naval bases and developed doctrine for amphibious operations at a time when the other militaries of the world, in the aftermath of Gallipoli, considered it a reckless mission. By 1926, the Marine Corps was teaching courses in Pacific strategy and amphibious operations. It was in Marine Corps schools that students and faculty developed a list of chronological steps for planning and executing amphibious operations, resulting in the historic 1934 *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*.<sup>55</sup> As Marines became experts in amphibious operations, they also trained US Army divisions in the tactics that would be used by them to land at Casablanca, Sicily, Anzio, and Normandy in the European theater; and at Kwajalein, Leyte, and Okinawa in the Pacific. Marines went further still and developed a landing craft and a reef-crossing tractor that became primary tools in both the Pacific and European theaters of World War II.<sup>56</sup>

After World War II, General Alexander A. Vandegrift summed up the importance of Marine Corps innovation during the interwar period, saying, “Despite its outstanding record as a combat force in the past war, the Marine Corps’ far greater contribution to victory was doctrinal: that is, the fact that the basic amphibious doctrines which carried Allied troops over every beachhead of World War II had been largely shaped—often in the face of uninterested and doubting military orthodoxy—by U.S. Marines,

and mainly between 1922 and 1935.”<sup>57</sup> The Marine Corps also added to counterinsurgency doctrine by codifying its vast experience in operations other than war in the *Small Wars Manual* in 1940—a manual that continues to prove its relevance in the 21st century.

Marine innovations have changed the character of war. Whether in developing a system to use naval gunfire in support of landing forces, studying the art of dive bombing, figuring out how to drop bombs at night and in all weather, or developing and proving the concept of maritime prepositioning, Marine leaders who combine vision and initiative make a difference.

## DECENTRALIZATION

Many years ago, a promotion examination scenario given during a class for lieutenants assigned them a figurative 10-person working party led by a sergeant, and told to erect a 75-foot flagpole. All lieutenants who tried to figure out how to erect the flagpole failed, no matter how accurate their calculations. The correct solution was to simply give the order, “Sergeant, put up that flagpole.”<sup>58</sup> This test illustrates the point that decentralized leadership is taught, expected, and practiced throughout the Marine Corps. Decentralization is simply authorizing subordinates to act, guided by commander’s intent and focus of effort, in situations where judgment and experience dictate action. The Marine Corps has long understood the advantage of allowing junior leaders to apply judgment and act on their decisions and has enjoyed great success decentralizing authority to the lowest levels. Marines fighting expeditionary wars during the first half of the 20th century exemplified this. Whether on


duty in the Legation Quarter in China during the 1920s, with the *gendarmierie* in Haiti, or on patrol with the Guardia in Nicaragua, junior Marines supported US policy; kept law and order; suppressed revolts against governments; and protected US lives, interests, and property.

During World War II, the actions of junior leaders were directly responsible for our successes in the island-hopping campaigns of the Pacific. Decentralized decision making—pushing authority, responsibility, and accountability to the lowest levels—promoted speed in execution. In battle after battle, small units were able to make a decisive difference because of the actions of subordinate leaders. Colonel Merritt A. Edson mentioned decentralization and adaptability as important contributors to the outcome in the battle for Tarawa, saying, “It is my opinion that the reason we won this show was the ability of the junior officers and [noncommissioned officers] to take command of small groups of six to eight or ten men, regardless of where these men came from, and to organize and lead them as a fighting team.”<sup>59</sup>

As a result of these experiences, the Marine Corps developed the modern-day fire team and produced the world’s finest noncommissioned officers. The tradition of encouraging decentralized decision making continues today and is manifested in such peacetime duty as that performed by Marine Security Guard detachments commanded by staff noncommissioned officers and the small-unit combat patrols in the strife-torn streets of every corner of the globe.

A testament to the skills of Marine small-unit leaders was the development of the combined-action program. First used with





**Marine Advisor in Afghanistan.**

success in Haiti (1915–1934), then later in Santo Domingo (1916–1922) and Nicaragua (1926–1933), and then used again in Vietnam.<sup>60</sup> Often, the combined force was commanded by a Marine squad leader—a sergeant or a corporal. In Iraq and Afghanistan, this concept took the form of small-unit training and advising teams embedding with Iraqi and Afghan security forces.

## RESILIENCY

A great and successful troop leader said that there comes a point in every close battle when each commander concludes that defeat is inevitable. The leader who carries on, wins.

*Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.*<sup>61</sup>

—Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift

Resiliency is an important aspect of a Marine's personal and professional life. It ensures that when faced with the challenges in and out of combat, they will be able to meet those challenges, drawing from internal and external sources of strength and support. Resilience can be objectively observed through physical and cognitive performance. How Marines build and maintain resilience is more subjective, meaning measures are influenced by unique factors and characteristics of the individual and the unit. Marines with a high degree of physical and cognitive performance build and maintain resiliency in the following four areas of Marine fitness.

**Physical Fitness:** In addition to regular physical training and exercise, physical fitness includes proper nutrition, injury prevention, and recovery to maximize performance. You must embrace discomfort and push yourself to new levels of physical strength and ability. Learning proper techniques for exercises, appropriate nutrition for your goals, and mutually supporting those around you are all ways to improve physical resiliency.

**Mental Fitness:** Mental fitness includes the mindset, attitudes, and practices that help one deal with various stressors that impede overall performance. We must recognize and accept that just “pushing through” a problem will only work for a short time and may delay or impede one’s ability to rebound from a difficult situation. Learning to recognize when you have a mental resiliency challenge that you may not be properly equipped to deal with, and then having the courage to seek someone who can give you that knowledge, is essential to your own personal growth.

**Spiritual Fitness:** Identifying our personal faith, foundational values, and moral living from a variety of sources and traditions helps us live out core values of honor, courage, and commitment, live the warrior ethos, and exemplify the character expected of a United States Marine. This is learning to trust in something larger than ourselves and laying the foundation for our moral character.

**Social Fitness:** Building a solid skillset that fosters cohesion, belonging, and trust in one's personal and professional relationships develops our social fitness. We have to know when to reach out for assistance and have the personal courage to do so. We all build social networks in our own way, and in such a diverse environment of people, socializing can be intimidating. However, we are all tied together as brother and sister Marines. That one solid, shared connection builds the foundation on which we develop a strong social community.

Adversity in life and in combat is unavoidable. Our ethos, our core values, and our training are all focused on developing the skills and abilities to address this conflict, have the strength to handle it, and the resiliency to restore ourselves to be even stronger than we

were before. These four fitness elements help us identify specific areas in which we must develop resiliency and give us the resources to do so. We must build our resiliency in a time where perhaps this strength is not yet needed, so that when challenge comes, we are prepared. As the popular Marine t-shirt slogan states, “The more we train in peacetime, the less we bleed in war.”

Combat power is “the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit or formation can apply against an enemy at a given time.”<sup>62</sup> Napoleon understood that the combat power of a unit is not measured solely by the number of people, rifles, tanks, cannons, trucks, fuel, ammunition, or airplanes a military force possesses when he said, “The moral is to the physical as three to one.”<sup>63</sup> By moral, Napoleon meant those resilient mental and spiritual qualities of a unit—an organization’s ability to conduct combat operations by overcoming challenges faced on the battlefield. Creating and sustaining superior combat power requires the combination of the tangible activities of war (maneuver, firepower, and protection) with the intangible elements of war (unit esprit, discipline, cohesion, and individual courage). It is these intangible qualities that make certain units superior to others on the battlefield. They enable organizations to take high casualties and continue their missions and can compensate for material deficiencies. It is the leaders who instill these intangible qualities such as our core values and those listed above in their Marines. In the end, “success in battle is not a function of how many show up, but who they are.”<sup>64</sup>

### **TRUST AND FAILURE**

Due to the high consequences for our actions as warfighters, it is easy to slip into a “zero defect” mentality. Leaders must actively fight this type of command climate. This is not to say that all errors are to be accepted as part of a Marine’s development or learning process. Leaders need to demonstrate sound judgment in assessing whether the error was a result of good initiative, bad judgment, or poor execution; or was the mistake part of a trend that if not appropriately addressed can result in the harm to personnel, equipment, or the mission.

Ultimately, this can be addressed by establishing a climate of trust, both horizontally and vertically within a command. Senior members need to foster an environment where juniors have the liberty to err and trust that their leadership will not stifle initiative, innovation, and peer leadership. Peers need to trust each other. Mistakes should be seen as opportunities to learn and help shape training. They should not be used to disparage or be leveraged for advancement, as this will destroy team cohesion and trust. Finally, juniors need to be empowered, to not only make mistakes themselves, but to handle minor tasks, decisions, and minor disciplinary issues within their scope. There is risk involved with trust, but that should not keep us from trusting. Leadership cannot develop if trust is not first offered, and we must understand that Marines exercise initiative for those they trust.

Without this trust, a command will stumble. Juniors will hesitate to exercise initiative, or even police their own, due to fear of overstepping their boundaries or even being met with negative consequences. They will become uncomfortable with contributing their knowledge or opinions, unwilling to make

suggestions counter to their leaders due to fear of reprisal or being disregarded. Environments like this create individuals, not teams. This is concerning, because even though all Marines are considered a member of the profession of arms—upon receiving the eagle, globe, and anchor at the conclusion of The Crucible (for enlisted Marines) or upon commissioning (for officers)—the strength of the Marine Corps, and the United States, for that matter, is in the wide swath of experiences brought to the table by its diverse group of people. Commands cannot create environments that are insular in nature, but instead must leverage its diverse population and the opinions of its members. When applied correctly, this access to new ideas increases adaptability that may be necessary to drive tempo and innovation and creates a more ready and lethal force.

Peers who trust each other are more apt to assist each other when one stumbles. This increases resiliency in the force. It creates a humble and competent team that is willing to build on each other's experiences and seek help when required, both personally and professionally. Criticism by peers is not viewed as a way to outshine each other, but recognized as constructive, and for the benefit of the institution. Tone is important and words have specific meanings. If a leader's message is not communicated properly then the subordinate's trust and willingness to try innovative ideas is challenged.

For senior members, the risks of a command without a proper balance in trust and failure is twofold. First, the leaders will become task-saturated when they do not allow themselves to delegate. They will execute tasks themselves, rather than leading and developing juniors by supervising and providing guidance. We must not avoid the path of leadership and learning, because the team where all are trained to become more

skilled will be a much stronger and more capable section. Although it may initially take more time to teach others the leadership lessons and competencies you have already learned and to correct the mistakes made along the way, the long-term result is well worth the effort.

Secondly, the leader runs the risk of not having the best possible solution presented to them. Marine leaders cannot afford to have the truth hidden from them due to fear of being disregarded or reprimanded for thinking outside the box. A leader who fosters an environment of trust dramatically increases effective decentralized operations, innovation, adaptability, *esprit de corps*, loyalty, morale, and resilience. These benefits are manifested because members of the unit are empowered to make decisions and learn, which also increases vertical and horizontal cohesion.

Lieutenant General Victor A. Krulak developed a set of rules to promote innovation and creativity from his own experience of senior officers encouraging innovation to embrace the Higgins boat and vertical envelopment doctrine within the Corps. He told leaders to make it their duty to bring subordinates' ideas and criticisms to the surface where all may analyze and evaluate them.<sup>65</sup> Ask for ideas and you will get them. Leaders must have an open door policy. Subordinates should use the chain of command, but ideas must rise to the top. Leaders must allow subordinates the opportunity to show initiative. Because innovation is imprecise and because subordinates, particularly junior ones, will make mistakes, protect them. "Zero defects" are not a standard of measurement. They do not encourage initiative; they stifle it. Lastly, emphasize that you expect honest expression of the subordinates' best thinking. Do not tolerate patronizing behavior!